More On CAPPS II

FOXNews has a fairly insightful piece online that delves into the concerns surrounding the CAAPS II screening program for air travelers. As I've mentioned before, I support the idea of the CAPPS II system, but this article does raise a few issues that need to be addressed.

Again, CAPPS II is a system in which the airlines run their passenger manifests against government databases in an effort to improve the travel experience while simultaneously providing more security for the flights. It's certainly a worthy goal, and one that I believe the government does have a legitimate interest in promoting. But there are also concerns about the databases themselves, civil liberties and privacy issues, and also about the absoluteness of the computer decision.

Looking at the biggest concerns first, I believe that there is validity to all three. Particularly the database issues.

I can certainly understand checking the manifest against criminal databases to help identify people who might require a bit of extra scrutiny - especially for those with violent rap sheets. The manifest should also be checked against a list of known or suspected terrorists. There should also be a check against names that the FBI has on file as being potential security risks, although they may not be terrorist risks. All of those are valid databases to run against.

What I believe are not valid, however, are the commercial databases. One, the accountability, even in theory, is not there. If something gets erroneously entered there is no assurance that the person making the error will ever even be reprimanded, much less have any action taken against them. Second, there is no commercial database that is going to provide security related information. All the security related databases are government run. Commercial databases, by their nature, are designed towards collecting information that will help sales, not security. Maybe I'm wrong, but I cannot think of a single security feature that might be provided with a commercial database, unless we started collecting information about every single item purchased, by everybody, at every store, and combined it all into a giant program that would go looking for combinations of purchases that could, possibly be used to make a weapon - or to clean a toilet. That kind of a database is a privacy and civil liberties violation. There is no legitimate need for the government to have that degree of information.

But getting back to the privacy issues surrounding CAPPS II, how serious are they? The biggest concern that I hear is about the sharing of the manifest with the government prior to the departure of the flight. I want to look at that a little more in depth, primarily because I think it gets to the root of the issue surrounding CAPPS II.

When you call to purchase a ticket, or you go online, or show up in person at the ticket counter, the airline is going to require that you part with a certain amount of personal information: name, address, phone number, itinerary, and so on. You are voluntarily giving this information to the airline as a condition of travel and most people never even think twice about it. It is a reasonable request.

Now the airlines have two interests in ensuring that you are not a terrorist about to board their aircraft. First, the aircraft itself is a multi-million dollar investment - some of them being measured in fractions of a billion dollars now - and they also are assuming responsibility for the safe transport of the people on board. The financial fallout of a preventable disaster is enormous. Second, they are also operating in one of the more heavily regulated industries in the country. The government has an interest in screening for terrorists as an aviation disaster almost always affects more than just the people on the airplane, it also is a matter of public safety. The airlines, in a desire to stay in business, have a very strong incentive, financially and regulatory, to comply with any government safety directive that might come down.

Now many will complain that this violates their privacy - which is not true since they willingly imparted the information as a condition of travel - and will say that in turn, by forcing them to decide between giving up some privacy or to refuse to fly that we are somehow violating their right to fly.

And I think that right there we have hit the flaw in the argument. There is no right to fly, just as there is no right to drive (the illegal aliens still haven't figured this one out, either). In fact, the only mode of transportation to which you have an unalienable right is the one that uses your own two feet. Even riding a bicycle subjects you to a level of government (you still have to obey traffic laws).

However, just because there is no right to fly does not mean that you should have to give up all your civil liberties in order to board an aircraft. No system, short of the complete elimination of powered and unpowered flight, is going to be completely fail safe in protecting people. There must be a degree of reasonableness and rationality included in determining the proper balance.

Which brings us around to the third complaint I've heard about CAPPS II, which is the red/yellow/green system of determining who shall fly and who does not.

The problem with the system is that it is too simplistic and there is no opportunity for human intervention to correct an obvious screw-up. This is also the point at which I believe that the airlines should be partnering up with TSA to increase the level of efficiency and security by doing some basic prescreening and also watching for people who might show on the system as green, but really need an additional level of scrutiny.

The customer service agents for the airlines should be asking more questions than they do. But not questions of interrogation. Engage the passenger in conversation. Listen for inconsistencies or skittishness. If, while talking to them, something doesn't seem right, bump them from a green to a yellow. It is at the ticket counter that we have the best opportunity to set the mood for experience (friendliness here would be good) while also trying to improve the effectiveness of the system.

Once the person leaves the ticket counter with their assigned color, that is where the real differentiation should come in. Folks in the green should be able to breeze through the rest of the system. Go through the metal detector and x-ray of carry-on items - just as it has been for years now - and enjoy the flight. This would be the experience for the vast majority of the people.

Those coded yellow should be subjected the higher security that everyone is currently getting. Spend more time talking to them. Spend more time searching them. These should be the people who have either come back with a criminal record or who are engaging in a fairly odd behavior. I say this full well understanding that my own travel patterns: same day round trip flights to Miami and multiple times to Atlanta for pleasure, not business, would very likely have dumped me into the yellow line. The vast majority of these people should also make it onto a flight, although maybe not the one they were hoping for.

It is the red people that are going to require the really special handling. These should be the folks that are considered to be a real and present threat to the security of the flight in some way, shape, or form. But as the example given to lead off the FOX story shows, there needs to be an opportunity for a human to intervene in the process to correct obvious mistakes. The red folks should be subjected to very intense questioning, in-depth searches of luggage, carry-ons, and person. Many of them likely will not board an airplane, but we need to have a mechanism that allows for the possibility. We want a human to be making the final decision, not a computer.

CAPPS II is a system that has a great deal of potential to improve the travel experience for millions of people per day. It also does have a few areas of concern. There needs to be a real safeguard in place against the collecting of a dossier on every American who flies. There need to be real, personal penalties for anyone - all the way up to the President - who willingly violates the safeguard provisions of the law. If it ever comes out that TSA, or any other agency or contractor, is maintaining such a file there must be in place a mechanism for it's immediate destruction.

The identity theft concern is already a concern when it comes to air travel and is not one affected solely by the CAPPS II program. The two issues, while they have a degree of intertwining are not mutually dependent on each other - and should not be viewed in such a light.

Will the system require profiling? Yes. Will we have to accept the unfortunate reality that most of the people singled out by the system are going to be either criminals or Arabic? Yes. This is an area in which, more so than other areas, we must not let political correctness get in the way of security.

CAPPS II probably isn't the perfect solution and, in its current form has some significant problems, but with some work and some tweaking, it is a viable alternative to old ladies being strip searched while real security threats could be boarding hundreds of flights every single day without our knowing. CAPPS II is a way of using technology to focus our limited resources without having to resort to the current randomness of it all.

CAPPS II is an expansion of the government. It does not, however, require the disclosure of any more information that travelers already disclose to purchase their tickets. It is simply a more effective use of that information in a manner that should improve the travel experience for a huge segment of the traveling public. It should not be Machiavellian in nature, the concerns must be addressed, but it is certainly a better starting point than any of the other suggestions out there.